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LIALPA
SlipStream Newsletter, January, 1999 Editor: Capt. R. J. Fitt, IFALPA Director for LIALPA |
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LIALPA
SlipStream Newsletter, January, 1999 Editor: Capt. R. J. Fitt, IFALPA Director for LIALPA |
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Correspondence
| The View From Here | Unlawful Interference
GAIN | The Human factors of CRM | LIALPA
Notice
Happy New Year to All.
1999 is upon us and brings with it new hope and trepidation for LIAT and its employees.
But the first thing on your mind as you read the first offering for the year is: What the hell are all these colours?
Well, I've discovered coloured fonts and am experimenting with new looks to make the newsletter a bit more appealing to the eye. I even persuaded my resident expert to cook up a new logo.
However, all this will only be apparent to those of you who are able to successfully receive the file attachment in your e-mail. Lucky you!
We'll see how it goes.
Many feel that the CEO has the right approach and expertise to get the airline into competitive shape. Over the past several weeks we have hosted several visitors from Speedwing who have been going through the various sections of the operation with a fine-toothed comb. The objective is to get a true picture of the state of LIAT.
It seems that over the years we have come to rely on "common knowledge" and have been applying "conventional wisdom" to guide us on our way. The facts that were known "way back when" eventually lost their validity, and the old ways have to change with the evolution of the marketplace. We have not been validating our facts and have not kept up with advances in management techniques that would help us to maximize our potential.
As the true picture emerges, a realistic course of action can be charted - this is where the trepidation comes in. Rumours are rampant that we will soon see a reduction in the fleet by two. The fear is that there will also be redundancies.
This is an outcome that none of us looks forward to. But the situation can be assessed in a different way - if our schedule can be operated with fewer airplanes, then we will have additional equipment to operate other services currently neglected for want of aircraft.
Chances are that the schedule may soon include some innovative movements designed to maximize high yields. But we must still keep a wary eye on the activities of our Southern neighbours.
Latest word is that the proposed start of BWIA's Dash 8 schedules has been postponed until later in the year. That event cannot be taken lightly as it would present perhaps the most credible threat to us yet. No good can come out of it for either party, but if it does result in BWIA divesting itself of its LIAT shares, that would be at least some benefit to us.
Another problem that this would cause for LIAT is that of an increase in training of replacements for those crewmembers who would prefer to pursue their fortunes from the Twin-Island Republic. We'll miss them but we should only wish them well in their careers.
In other developments around the region, it seems that Helen Air will soon be down-sizing, possibly acquiring Twin Otters to replace the Beech 1900s. We still await the rebirth of Cardinal - while we wish our former colleagues well in the pursuit of their chosen profession, the continual postponements of startup - in what seems to my untrained eye to be a dubious enterprise - does not bode well. One might also wish to bear in mind the possible liability implications from their recent accident in Dominica.
Looking further South, we see that Guyana Airways has all but expired in a bottomless pit of debt. It is to be privatized in the near future - not soon enough as far as the Government of Guyana is concerned. This situation represents a unique opportunity to develop the shell of GAC into a viable carrier.
Among prospective bidders are Lucky Samaroo of Air Caribbean in Trinidad. Should he succeed, Air Caribbean/GAC would be in a position to create huge problems for BWIA. That carrier is also in the game.
Needless to say, a LIAT/GAC merger would REALLY be interesting. (Show me the money!).
So, we should have a most interesting year ahead of us. I hope we will still all be together at the end of it, looking forward to more prosperous times ahead.
You should all be aware that recently a passenger on one of our flights decided to play a prank and declared that he had a bomb on board the aircraft. At first the Flight Attendant did not take him seriously, but on the next sector, when he refused to comply with her request to fasten his seatbelt prior to take-off, she reported the threat to the Captain, who declared an emergency.
The individual was taken into custody and kept there off and on for at least two weeks until he was released and deported again (he was already being deported when the incident occurred.) No prosecution was brought against him because it was felt that the matter should have been dealt with when it first occurred and, since the Flight Attendant didn't feel threatened, then it probably wasn't the intention of the individual to make a serious threat. However, it is unlikely that he would wish to repeat his experience.
Once upon a time, the public held flight crews in awe and treated them with the respect due to the lesser gods we were felt to be. No more. With the realization that flight was achieved by physics, not metaphysics, a growing number of individuals have chosen to display their contempt for order by refusing to comply with air regulations, and even verbally and physically assaulting flight crews in the performance of their duties. (One must admit that there is a down side to education.)
Often, alcohol is involved in these incidents, with the perpetrator often being inebriated. This trend has even been noticed at the level of ICAO, and stern action is being taken by some of the more developed countries and larger airlines to stamp out this behaviour.
Unfortunately, the reaction in our little corner of paradise has been to sweep it under the carpet and hope nobody notices. While Antigua was at least willing to explore the possibility of a prosecution in this instance, other territories have refused to treat such incidents as cases of interference with air crews, in one case treating it as a simple assault and, in another, denying jurisdiction altogether.
LIAT is now taking a harder line, but action has to be taken to train the flight crews and give them the tools needed to deal more effectively with such incidents of interference.
GAIN -- Global Analysis Information Network
Legal Issues Associated with Sharing -- The Pilot's Perspective
by Captain Paul McCarthy
(Capt. McCarthy is Chairman of the IFALPA Accident Analysis (AA) Committee.)
Unless and until a particular piece of information is rendered anonymous as to the operating crew, it presents a threat. To encourage complete and permanent de-identification, I will try and define the nature of the threat and the measures available to minimize it.
At the outset it must be clear that I am only discussing the nature of the information at the time of GAIN input. The protections afforded information between the time of initial collection and distribution through GAIN are governed by national law, corporate policy and collectively bargained agreements.
Pilots are exposed to three levels of threat by prosecution:
Discipline -- for any infraction, ranging from "counseling" to discharge, which can have drastic consequences on the future career of the pilot.
Certificate Action by the Regulatory Authority -- variable, from recertification to revocation of an individual airman certificate. While discipline can be levied without certificate action, certificate action invariably will be accompanied by discipline.
Criminal Liability -- this can range from misdemeanor (noise rule violation, collision with object while taxiing) to major felony (death of a passenger due to negligent operation) to capital felony (intentional misconduct resulting in death).
To understand the extent of the threat, a review of certain evidentiary principles is in order. Direct evidence of an event may be obvious (crash site) or concealed (descent below minimum safe altitude). In either case, all that is revealed by the direct evidence is that an event occurred. To determine culpability, circumstantial evidence or recorded data will have to be utilized. This category of evidence will require subjective interpretation by the finder of fact.
In an accident scenario or an observed violation of the regulations, all facts not otherwise protected are available for prosecution at the various levels. The most obvious example of information that is or should be protected from such use is the Cockpit Voice Recorder.
Annex 13 to ICAO incorporates a standard requiring confidentiality of the cockpit voice recordings (para. 5.12). The rationale behind confidentiality is the recognition of the importance of the information to accident investigation and hence to aviation safety, and an acknowledgment of the invasion of privacy that it represents to the crew members.
As the crew members have the ability to disable the recorder if they feel that their privacy interests are not adequately protected, ICAO encourages national legislation that prevents abuse of the data, either by the prosecutorial function or by the media. This seems to be no more than a logical extension of legal principles that oppose forced self-incrimination.
Products of forced self-incrimination should not, at the least, be admissible in furtherance of a prosecution. For cockpit voice recordings, this logic is clear. For other forms of information collection, the argument becomes somewhat more difficult, but the required balancing of interests remains.
Written reports fall into two categories:
Voluntary reports, if not protected, will not be made. Voluntary reports, if not encouraged, will be few and far between.
Mandatory reports, if not protected, will be so perfunctory as to be useless. The same rules apply to post-flight interviews.
By far, the most prolific source of information is recorded data. As with voice recordings, data recordings must balance the enhancement of aviation safety against the privacy interests of the operating crew, and the requirement that evidence gained by forced self-incrimination not be used as a basis for prosecution. It is not clear that the recording of a parameter rises to the same level of privacy invasion or self-incrimination as does a voice recording.
Further, of the wide variety of sources of recorded data, flight crews typically do not have the option of disabling the entire data stream. Historically, protection of this class of information is best accomplished by industrial agreement.
In all cases, crew cooperation and endorsement of the information collection scheme would seem to be a practical prerequisite, easily accomplished. In a sense, the crews are the ultimate users of the collected information as a means to enhance the safety and efficiency of the operation. Coercive measures would seem antithetical to the ultimate program goals.
As stated above, a combination of legal protection and industrial agreement should result in, at a minimum, confidentiality of the collected information. Some exclusionary protection should be afforded to prevent prosecutorial abuse. These will serve to answer the protection question within a particular carrier and jurisdiction, the entry point into GAIN.
As information moves into GAIN, national law, corporate policy and industrial agreement no longer provide a protective shield against abuse. The only answer to the protection question in the global arena is complete and permanent de-identification. If the identity key is retained by any party after a time interval suitable to local analysis, legal process may be employed to compel the production of the identity information.
The pilot community insists that the balance will always result in the requirement for anonymity of all information shared through GAIN. We further encourage all operators and jurisdictions to evaluate the balance inherent in such coercive data acquisition methods and to resolve it in favor of a data policy calculated to maximize the cooperation of the pilot community in reaching the air safety goals.
By Richard O. Reinhart, MD
(From an article from the February 1994 issue of B/CA Magazine.)
Crew Resource Management - or CRM - is a term becoming more familiar in the aviation industry. But if you ask 5 line pilots, 5 chief pilots and 5 instructors what CRM means, you will get at least 18 different responses.
Contrary to popular belief, CRM is NOT a course. It is not something you read about to fill a training requirement square, and then forget. CRM is not "hot tub psychology" for pilots. In fact, many CRM developers wish that the term "CRM" would go away because of these misperceptions. CRM is not a "quick fix" to safety concerns.
CRM IS an operational philosophy, a means of doing things, and like the generic term "safety", it is built around people working with people in unpredictable situations to ensure safe and productive performance.
CRM is an ongoing, reinforced program for enhancing personal skills.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) defines CRM as "...the effective use of all available resources, i.e. equipment, procedures and people, to achieve safe and efficient flight operations."
The FAA uses the same definition and adds "CRM training has been conceived to prevent aviation accidents by improving crew performance through better crew coordination." Again, like the concept of safety, CRM is difficult to be very specific about, yet few will question the intent.
However, CRM won't work effectively if it doesn't utilize the principles of aviation human factors. In fact, CRM was originally born as just one of the components of human factors, researched and developed by human factors specialists throughout the world, including John Lauber, Bob Helmreich and Clay Foushee. CRM, therefore, is a part of human factors, not the other way around. But CRM has become the accepted "buzzword" and human factors has taken a second seat. But that doesn't mean human factors is any less important.
In ICAO's eyes, human factors is "....essentially a multidisciplinary field. The disciplines include, but are not limited to: engineering, psychology, physiology, medicine, sociology and anthropometry. ......to be concerned with diverse elements in the aviation system. These include human behavior and performance, decision making and other cognitive processes, the design of controls and displays,......"
Human factors, not CRM, is the first topic to be defined in FAA's Advisory Circular AC 120-51A "Crew Resource Management Training" and they say that human factors "...incorporates the methods and principles of the behavioral and social sciences, engineering, and physiology. Human factors is the applied science which studies people working together in concert with machines."
To better explain the relationship between these many disciplines, ICAO has adopted the SHEL model: L S---L---E H
S equals Software (procedures, symbology, etc), H equals Hardware (machinery, equipment, etc), E equals Environment (external and internal), and L equals Liveware (the human element).
The interactions in this model all affect the center and hence the interfaces of LH or "Liveware-Hardware", LS or "Liveware-Software", LL or "Liveware-Liveware", and LE or "Liveware-Environment". Every element of human factors and CRM can be expressed by considering these interactions.
For example, the LH interface would consider control and display design leading to common errors in interpretation, especially in the new glass cockpits. Personal comfort, cockpit visibility, motor workload and alerting and warning systems are added factors.
The LS relationship regards standard operating procedures and their benefits, written materials with errors in interpretation of maps, charts and checklists. This is also the area of the operational aspects of automation including situation awareness, workload, and interpretation.
The LE interface considers the internal comforts or discomforts such as temperature, noise, vibration, lighting, etc. The external part looks at terrain, weather, time of day and other air traffic.
The LL relationship is the situation where CRM is incorporated using insight and skills of interpersonal actions, communication, problem solving and decision making plus using all resources and crew available. LL interface is probably the most important and the most respected by flight crews and is often a major part of the very well recognized and too often used term "pilot error".
Another way of looking at these inter-relationships is to look at how we function in the cockpit-controlling the aircraft- through the techniques of information gathering (from sight, sound, and feel of the activities of flight), information transfer (how information is transmitted to the mind and body), information processing (how the mind interprets the various signals it is exposed to) and finally the action taken by the pilot on the controls. What happens next will generate new information, and the cycle repeats itself. Obviously, there are many of the cycles happening at the same time and at different phases of the cycles.
How well the pilot functions or how impaired he or she is from physiological and psychological effects will determine how effective and safe is the performance and the SHEL interface and information processing is impaired. Simple distraction, fatigue, dehydration, hypoxia, disorientation, stress and the many other "human factors" can lead to a multitude of end results. CRM can be effective in identifying, recognizing and acting on "disconnects" of the SHEL interfaces or information processing. But even CRM skills can be impaired from the same adverse effects of human factors.
This whole concept could be very confusing and somewhat overwhelming, but so can maintaining safe flight. This confusion is not resolved simply by learning and practicing CRM. More simply stated, the best trained pilot in CRM skills will falter if fatigue, self-medication, jet lag and other human factors impair judgement and decision making-and we all know that it does. Indeed, if CRM continues its acceptance and growth, it is imperative that human factors be included in the training to keep CRM effective.
CRM isn't going to be accepted by everyone, and many will minimize the effects of human factors on performance. Incorporating CRM and human factors into our daily lives isn't going to happen overnight or even over several months. It must be a part, even unconsciously, of everything we do. Anyone can fly an airplane. The true professional does it well under all conditions in a team situation. These CRM and human factors skills are being continually reinforced through experience, example and training.
The 70% occurrence rate of human factors' role in accidents and incidents is generally accepted. But these are REPORTED situations. How many "near accidents" have gone unreported because we were lucky? How many are and will be prevented by using CRM AND respecting human factors? CRM is a part of human factors and neither are independently effective. They both must be an essential part of all training, as important as improving pilots techniques. BCA Magazine - Richard O. Reinhart, MD
(This section will be removed by 15 February)
From: Secretary LIALPA
Please be advised that there will be an EMERGENCY meeting of the members of LIALPA at Sunset Cove on Monday 15th February 1999 at 7:00 PM. All LIALPA members are urged to attend.
Item for discussion : (a) SALARIES
Failure to have a quorum by 7:30 PM will result in the cancellation of the meetings.
Correspondence | The View From Here | Unlawful Interference
GAIN | The Human factors of CRM | LIALPA
Notice
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