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LIALPA SlipStream Newsletter, Editor:
Capt. R. J. Fitt |
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LIALPA SlipStream Newsletter, Editor:
Capt. R. J. Fitt |
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News and
Views | Simulator Sickness | Twins
#;^)
The Politics of Aviation Safety | A Lesson in
Worms #;^)
Proposed Amendments | A Professional
Approach #;^)
Here we are again, a month later and LES has only just departed, further delayed by the ingenious machinations of various legal buzzards (may their forked tongues stick in their gullets). With luck, it should be back in about six weeks with a new bottom.
It had been hoped that a change in the Operations Dept. management might have resolved this chronic problem. Clearly this hope was misplaced. This is yet another symptom of the inability of the management team to prepare and execute plans in a timely manner.
The recurrent failures in this respect would strain the most cordial of partnerships. However the relationship between LIALPA and the management of LIAT cannot be described in those terms. There is a growing mountain of unresolved issues which is threatening to produce an effect akin to that to be seen in nearby Plymouth. Unfortunately the attitude of those nominally in control is to engage in a wrongheaded game of "chicken." Are they correct in their assessment of the risk?
These must be delivered to the Secretary well in advance for inclusion on the agenda. It would be useful if they were also published, along with an explanation in support of the resolution so that members would have time to consider them in advance of the meeting. This forum is available.
I would like to suggest that the AGM should include a formal dinner with invitees from other sections of the aviation community. This approach was adopted on a number of occasions in the past and in my opinion, served to raise the morale and profile of the Association then, and could do so again.
Richard O. Reinhart, MD
You've just completed three hours in the simulator, where you were concentrating on the many scenarios thrown at you by the instructor. You're tired and ready to head home as soon as the debriefing is finished. You're still pumped up by your accomplishments, however-so much so that you aren't concerned that you're a bit shaky when you walk to the classroom. But as you walk to your car a little later, you feel nauseous and kind of dizzy, and you're aware of a strange feeling of unsteadiness. "Maybe I'm coming down with the flu," you grumble to yourself.
Maybe. But it's more likely that you're experiencing the symptoms related to being in a full-motion simulator for several hours-a syndrome called "Simulator Sickness"-a disorder that is receiving increasing attention in the aeromedical community.
Simulator Sickness Syndrome (SSS)-or "simulator induced postural instability," as some researchers say-has been studied since 1957, but has gained more recognition in past years as a result of the ability of high-tech simulators to duplicate virtually all sensory perceptions that are found in real flight. There's enough reality that type ratings and upgrades are now achievable solely through training and certification within a simulator.
In recent years, much work has been done by Robert S. Kennedy, Ph.D., and his associates at the Essex Corp., an Orlando-based engineering services company. Kennedy's research has been reported in many articles in Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine, the journal of the Aerospace Medical Association. Dr. Kennedy and other researchers have recognized that SSS produces symptoms similar to motion sickness (nausea, dizziness, disorientation and eye strain) but without vomiting. Of added importance is the finding that postural instability is an added symptom unique to SSS. This unsteadiness is directly associated with full-motion simulators, but varies with type of simulators (i.e. fixed wing, helicopter and ground vehicle simulators such as military tanks). Of greater concern, symptoms can be felt hours after the simulator ride has been completed.
Our perception of movement and orientation is achieved through the systems of our inner ear (vestibular and otolithic systems) and the proprioceptive signals from our muscles and tendons. Those varied signals, as processed by the brain, are coupled with inputs from our peripheral vision, a powerful sensory source orienting our position relative to the horizon. Therefore, in the real world of flight, the brain interprets the information from all these physiological sources as they manifest actual movement, and informs us of our true orientation.
To give the perception of motion and orientation when it is not really occurring, the simulator continuously fools these sensory systems by duplicating their signals through the creative motions of the simulator. The subject's full visual field is telling the brain where the horizon is. It's well known that if the visual input is even a fraction of a second off the artificial movement signals, the result is an overpowering sensation of motion sickness. However, it has been thought that these "false sensory signals" were a short-term sensory conflict. Now, however, research shows that, like adapting to the motion of a seagoing ship (getting your "sea legs"), re-adapting to the real-world stability of ground and horizon, even after only a few hours in a simulator, takes some time. This is similar to adapting from micro-gravity in the space shuttle back to the earth's gravity. SSS can take hours to overcome, especially in the new six planes of motion and 180-plus-degree visual field common in newer simulators.
Many of the studies on SSS used questionnaires and observations by researchers during and after simulator rides. Over the years, these questionnaires and surveys have become an accurate identification of symptoms relative to the different types of simulators being evaluated. Furthermore, monitoring postural orientation (or the lack thereof, which is called ataxia) and performance (walking a straight line, maintaining balance and the "leans") resulted in a statistically significant consistency of symptoms experienced over periods of time after subjects left the simulator.
Symptoms commonly expressed were the same as those of traditional motion sickness, except for the absence of actual vomiting. Ataxia, unsteadiness, blurred vision, deterioration of concentration and dizziness became the unique and repeatable symptoms of SSS. Furthermore, it became apparent that these symptoms resulted from the simulator ride, but not from the same maneuvers in actual flight. The primary objectives, therefore, of most of the studies was to identify symptoms resulting directly from the simulator rides and-even more important-how long those symptoms lasted after the ride. SSS was then identified as a potential impairment factor for flight shortly after a simulator experience. As some researchers observed, using full motion may not be appropriate for some training because SSS is an unacceptable yet unnecessary risk in flight soon after a simulator ride. In other words, full motion may not be needed in many kinds of training.
Here are some of the findings of the SSS studies that most affect pilots. It is noted that there is wide variance between individuals and types of simulators. The fact remains, however, that a high percentage of pilots (at least one in five) do suffer some degree of SSS for a significant time after the simulator ride.
- Twelve to 60 percent of pilots reported experiencing some symptoms of SSS, 25 to 60 percent of those symptoms lasted more than one hour after the ride, eight to 15 percent lasted more than six hours.
- Fifty-one percent of the symptoms reported were nausea, 28 percent were disorientation and 21 percent were visuomotor (blurred vision, difficulty focusing and visual fatigue/ headaches).
- Disorientation, motion sickness and ataxia are closely related in the re-adaptation process, and there remains discussion as to what causes each of them. The individual symptoms, especially the troublesome ataxia, however, are clearly identified by the pilot.
- As would be expected, the greater the "reality" of the simulator ride (i.e., the more sensory inputs that are affected), the higher the incidence and the longer the existence of SSS's symptoms.
- Experienced pilots have a higher prevalence of SSS than do inexperienced pilots because, as explained by the researchers, "discrepancies in simulator-motion feedback and aircraft-motion feedback are more evident to an experienced pilot who is highly tuned to the aircraft's control behavior."
- SSS symptoms seem to last longer and are more noticeable in helicopter simulators.
- While there may be a tolerance build-up for motion sickness-type symptoms, there was an increase in postural instability, lasting up to 10 hours.
- Twenty-five percent of the variance in SSS can be related to length of the simulator ride, regardless of the sensory disruptions. This means that instructors could be more at risk.
SSS is real, highly unpredictable, related in intensity to length of simulator time and levels of sensory disruption, and can last for hours after finishing a ride. As one researcher says: "Individuals with measurable unsteadiness following simulator exposures should remain in the simulator building until the symptoms subside. Simulators and flight exercises which produce the highest ataxia scores should be identified and, following exposure to the high risk situations, appropriate and formal restrictions should be applied to subsequent activities [e.g., flying, driving]."
It can be extrapolated, based on studies thus far, that full-motion simulators may cause impairments that are not justified for the type of training used. The reality of most flights can be duplicated with a visual simulation and without the conflicting inputs from the body's other sensory systems. In the words of Dr. Kennedy: "After a simulator ride, you may get over the conspicuous motion sickness-type symptoms relatively soon. However, the effects related to postural instability, which are not so obvious, may still be present and these symptoms can be experienced unexpectedly hours later."
An unmarried woman is pregnant and gets into an auto accident. She suffers a head injury and lapses into a coma for nine months. When she awakens in the hospital, she panics and asks about her baby.
Her doctor is called in and gives her a mild sedative, then he sits down to answer her questions. "I'm so happy to see you recovering", he says.
The woman responds, "Thank you doctor, but what about my baby? Is everything all right?"
"Yes, despite your injury, we were able to perform a fairly normal delivery procedure. In fact," he goes on, "you've given birth to twins - a boy and a girl."
She is very happy and asks when she can see her new babies. The doctor replies, "Right away, but we've already sent the infants home with your brother. We'll call and tell him you're okay.While you were unconscious, your brother took care of everything for you. He even gave the babies names."
At this point, the woman is distraught, "Doctor, my brother is an idiot! What name did he give my little girl?"
"Denise." The doctor answered.
"Oh, Denise, that's not so bad. What name did he give my boy?"
"Denephew".
Address by Anthony J. Broderick to "Aviation Safety: Confronting the Future."
Politics
When asked to give a talk about the politics of aviation safety, I jumped at the chance, but probably not for the reasons many of you would expect. "Politics" can stand in the way of safety improvements, silence necessary technical debate, create allegations of safety problems where there are none, raise expectations of accident prevention when the cause to be eliminated is not understood, damage otherwise technically excellent aviation safety organizations, and be career threatening (or even worse).
Many in the aviation safety business consider anything not completely logical, or not strictly contained within the realm of aviation technical expertise, to be "political," and they sometimes use that term with great disdain.
I will be provocative and say that I believe that it is politics, over the long term, which has made aviation as safe as it is; we must become better political practitioners if we are to substantially improve aviation safety, both here and abroad.
Institutional Politics
Aside from a gruesome tale probably involving some horribly lurid and socially reprehensible act, an aviation disaster is the single story type that will fill the news for days at a time, or even longer.
Prof. Arnie Barnett's landmark review of one year of New York Times front page story subjects documented this anecdote in a scholarly manner. He found that front page coverage of air crashes far outstripped the attention paid to other forms of death by a wide margin.
Our individual personal experiences will not challenge his finding, and we know that even crashes of small airplanes involving little or no loss of life receive publicity far greater than even a far more severe auto accident.
The news media do not publicize events about which the public cares little. Their sophisticated market research tools direct their coverage to things about which the public cares, or fears, and for which they will pay to read about.
If the public cares about it, so do politicians. If the public fears something, politicians search for quick ways to address those fears. People who propose quickly to address a public concern about an air crash stand a good chance of getting the publicity that is associated with wide coverage of the event.
Thus, we have a formula for precisely the opposite of what makes technical sense: An air crash tends to generate a search for quick solutions that sound plausible, so that those who promote a solution, or who are willing to speculate on the accident cause, will benefit from the attendant accident publicity.
There are so many who seek publicity that when more sensitive and sensible people take a prudent course of action, waiting to get the facts before reaching a conclusion, the media will turn elsewhere for comment. The print and electronic media are on deadlines, and yesterday's story is worth little to them.
There is little reward in the short term for those who prefer to wait until the facts are in before reaching conclusions. I say "in the short term," because over the long run, the public, politicians and the media are discriminating, and recognize technical excellence in terms of spokespersons, analysts and reporting, be it in the technical or lay press.
But this discrimination leaves room, before the facts are in, for a lot of sensationalism.
In the US, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is part of the Department of Transportation (DOT). The Administrator, therefore, does not report to the President, but to the Secretary of Transportation.
It is not, then, the view of the Administrator that we hear when he or she is speaking, but the view of the Administrator as approved by the Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST) that is being stated. OST serves as a filter to the views of the Administrator, deciding whether or not they represent a politically acceptable position for him or her to take.
The political acceptability of a technical position provided by a subordinate is, of course, a necessary fact of life. The President must be supportive of the positions taken by the FAA Administrator.
Unfortunately, it only serves to bog down the decision-making process when, in addition to the President, the Administrator has to cater for the views of the Secretary, as interpreted by the OST staff who are not aviation safety specialists, and who may care more about how a given decision reflects on the Secretary in the press, than whether it advances air safety.
Finding a solution that is politically acceptable, from the OST viewpoint, to increasingly complex and controversial aviation technical issues has become the single biggest obstacle to speedy decision-making in the FAA.
The rulemaking process in FAA moves at glacial speed largely because of the horrific delays imposed by this process, and many fundamental questions of policy and budget are not even raised because of the impossibility of having a good debate about their merits with the Secretary.
OST staff has served very effectively to isolate him or her from the debate, and prevent the vigorous discussion by FAA of civil aviation policy issues. Indeed, FAA does not make nor articulate civil aviation safety policy in the US, nor should they be blamed for the lack of progress of much needed regulatory change. FAA can only draft proposed regulations, they cannot issue them without the Secretary's approval.
Rushing to provide the public with information on means to improve safety with the smoking debris of an air tragedy in the background has become more and more commonplace on the part of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
Unfortunately, this is an area in which speed is not only unnecessary but usually harmful to information accuracy. It is also, however, an area in which speed has its rewards in the form of publicity, and the NTSB is composed of 5 political appointees who serve 5 year terms and are eligible for reappointment.
The NTSB is, by law, balanced in terms of political party and has a majority who are required to have some form of accident investigation experience. In the last few years the Board has tended to take positions which seem to many to be based less on reasoned objective technical analysis of facts, and more on a need to quickly pronounce a means to avoid a similar tragedy.
The latest example of this is their call for major changes to fuel handling hardware and procedures in the wake of the TWA 800 tragedy. The solutions they have proposed are expensive, have not been shown to be effective in achieving safety improvements, and may not even address the very cause of the accident itself, because they have not determined what it is!
International Issues.
While politics in the domestic arena can have negative effects, these are amplified in the international arena. International aviation safety is governed by the requirements of the 1944 Convention on International Aviation (Chicago Convention) which is implemented by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) of the United Nations.
The Chicago Convention and its 18 technical annexes contain a vast technical prescription of requirements for aviation safety oversight and other important technical standards. The 185 countries who have acceded to the Convention have thereby agreed to follow these international safety oversight standards.
Over the past decade, it has become generally well accepted that most countries of the world do not abide by these obligations. In the US, firm unilateral measures have been taken to require countries who oversee flag carriers operating to the US to correct their safety oversight deficiencies, or stop serving the US.
As of mid-September, 14 nations have thus been "black listed," and 15 have been give "Category 2" status that requires additional US oversight and prohibits their airlines from increasing service to the US. Category 2 status creates a serious economic problem for these airlines after only a few months of being "frozen."
Information on the safety oversight compliance status of all countries whose carriers serve the US is made publicly available. While not attractive to other countries, the US example was followed first in Europe, and then adopted by ICAO. Indeed, this US policy initiative has made an extraordinarily positive contribution to improved safety oversight around the world.
There are several points to be made about the influence of "politics" on international aviation safety oversight.
First, the US position was developed as a direct result of a review of these issues spurred by adverse, sensational and inaccurate news media coverage of a foreign airline crash in New York. The timing of the review was dictated by a congressional oversight hearing that was scheduled largely because of this sensational publicity, and the FAA testimony at that hearing "announced" the change to US policy.
At the time, the new US policy to assess the adequacy of foreign government oversight of their airlines which fly to the US was received warmly, and the fact that there was to be no public release of the FAA findings resulting from these reviews was accepted as part of the initiative. I believe that the strategic direction followed in this case is a good example of how one can use "politics" to promote safety ends.
The policy changes were presented to the appropriate decision-makers in a manner and at times in which it was very difficult for them to "say no." The policy changes were quickly accepted in the US executive and legislative branches, and consistently reinforced.
In fact, it was at OST's insistence that the public disclosure aspect of the policy was adopted, over initial FAA objections. Here is an example in which technical people in FAA were too conservative, and "the politicians" were right.
What we have seen, however, is that the US pointing to technical safety oversight shortcomings which are generally uncontested in the main does not automatically result in their correction.
Time after time, shortcomings in national aviation safety related laws, regulations, and program implementation have been documented by US (and now ICAO) teams, and little is usually done to correct them, at least initially. There is a great feeling that much of the US motivation is "political" in this program.
Many countries believe that this program represents a deliberate effort to place the non-US country under the "influence" of the American regulatory and industrial system, and provides favoritism to those countries whose airlines buy US manufactured aircraft.
In addition, many non-US airlines believe that the program is aimed at giving competing US airlines an advantage, because so many are adversely affected by their country's Category 2 status. These beliefs, no matter how incorrect they may be, make it difficult to get beyond the "politics" of the situation and work on safety oversight improvements.
Very often they result in attempts, on the part of governments (promoted by their airlines) to find a political or other non-technical solution to the problem, which inevitably only delays adoption of an effective solution.
To address the safety shortcomings found in FAA or ICAO safety oversight assessments, it is necessary first to ensure that there is the political will to do so at an appropriately senior government level.
Changes to laws and regulations, strengthening of government safety oversight and enforcement functions, and obtaining more resources for these efforts cannot be successful without political support, because these are essentially political, not technical, program decisions.
Since the program's inception, 12 countries have moved from unacceptable assessment status to one indicating their compliance with ICAO safety oversight standards. In every case, these successes have been largely the result of very high level political support being given to the civil aviation authorities involved.
The Way Forward.
The obvious, by now, is commonly accepted: If traffic continues to grow, and accident rates are not reduced, more accidents will occur. In fact, however, the real growth in accidents will not come in the US, because the US market is a mature one.
Projected regional growth, according to one manufacturer's projections, varies between some 30% more flights expected in the North American and Caribbean region to some 170% more flights in Asia over the next 20 years.
It is risky to translate these projections into fatalities from civil aviation, but a projection based on these data, factoring in anticipated increases in aircraft size and load factor on a regional level leads to the following increases in fatalities from crashes of western built jet transports, in 2016, over the last 5-year average fatality rate (1992-1996): for the world, a 160% increase (to about 1800); for Asia, a 250% increase to 835; for Europe, including all countries west of the Urals, a 190% increase to 320; for South and Central America, a 150% increase, to 270; for Africa, a 70% increase, to 150; and for N. America and the Caribbean, a 60% increase to 210.
An 80% reduction in the US accident rate, the politically inspired goal of the Gore Commission, will of course be welcomed but will not make a substantial contribution to reducing the global accident rate.
US citizens increasingly travel aboard international carriers, and we must redouble our efforts to work with other countries to improve their safety oversight and effect reductions in their accident rates. To reduce accident rates here and abroad requires improved political skills on the part of safety specialists.
Aviation safety improvements will come because the public is terribly intolerant of anything less than perfect air safety. This demand is eagerly recognized by the media, and results in headlines when crashes occur or air safety is said to be threatened for almost any reason.
Opportunities to be seen as correcting a highly visible problem are seized upon by politicians in many countries, and results in a continuing pressure on safety regulators to do better. At least in part, this pressure must be welcomed. In these days of difficult budget pressures in all governments, how else can resources be obtained?
One down side of this political pressure is the unfortunate credibility often given to cries to "do something," regardless of the significance of the problem or the practicality of the proposed solution. These "false alarms" result in wasted resources.
Another down side is the instant credibility almost automatically given to people who criticize air safety authorities or programs. These "false prophets" generally earn little more than their 15 minutes of fame but they, too, cause wasted resources.
Perhaps the most difficult problem caused by "political pressure" on the safety specialists is the rapidly declining attractiveness of being one. Since 1994, the senior government safety regulators in France, the United States, Canada, Australia, and England have retired from their positions, most because of cumulative fatigue from dealing with the daily conflict associated with their positions.
It is fair to say that the senior safety regulation positions in most governments are becoming much harder to fill because of the heavy non-technical pressures felt by the incumbents.
When all is said and done, we must recognize reality: Pressures to improve safety will continue. Technically unreasonable demands on safety regulators will continue. Outrageous claims about safety problems, or safety improvements, will continue.
Many newspapers will continue to sensationalize air safety issues. Many politicians will take advantage of potential press coverage, and make demands or claims that do not advance anything but coverage of their statements.
But all of these things taken together create a bureaucratic environment that encourages that plentiful resources be allocated to air safety programs, resources far in excess of other similar (or even more deserving) government programs.
They also provide a regulatory environment that permits extraordinarily high levels of safety systems and procedures to be imposed on the aviation industry.
Taken together, political factors tend to provide an environment for continuous improvement in air safety. Political decisions are not always wrong. It is up to the safety specialists to recognize this, hone their political skills, and advance safety as efficiently as possible.
A professor of chemistry wanted to teach his 5th grade class a lesson about the evils of liquor, so he produced an experiment that involved a glass of water, a glass of whiskey, and two worms.
"Now, class. Observe closely the worms," said the professor, putting a worm first into the water. The worm writhed about, happy as a worm in water could be.
The second worm, he put into the whiskey. It writhed painfully, and quickly sank to the bottom, dead as a doornail.
"Now, what lesson can we derive from this experiment?" the professor asked.
Johnny, who naturally sits in back, raised his hand and wisely responded, "Drink whiskey and you wont get worms."
Three accountants were in the urinal performing their morning constitutional.
The first accountant finishes and walks over to the sink to wash his hands. He then proceeds to dry his hands very carefully. He uses paper towel after paper towel and ensures that every single spot of water on his hands is dried. Turning to the other two other accountants, he says "At KPMG, we are trained to be extremely thorough".
The second accountant finishes his task at the urinal and he proceeds to wash his hands. He uses a single paper towel and makes sure that he dries his hands using every available portion of the paper towel. He turns and says "At Ernst & Young, not only are we trained to be extremely thorough but we are also trained to be extremely efficient".
The third accountant finished and walks straight for the door. "At Arthur Andersen, we don't pee on our hands".
Here are some proposals for amendments to our Constitution. If any one wishes to include others in future issues, just put a copy in my dip with instructions, or e-mail them to me (preferably).
- "Any proposed course of action which might reasonably be expected to incur expenditures of LIALPA funds in excess of $2000.00, must be approved by a majority of LIALPA Members represented at a duly constituted meeting, or in the absence of such a meeting, a majority of Members polled by written ballot."
Explanation:
At present, there are no checks on possibly unwarranted or injudicious expenditures of Association funds. The base figure, which can be amended, is set at a level to cover normal recurrent expenses of the Association.Projects entailing the commitment of large amounts of money, such as protracted legal cases, or large equipment purchases, should only be undertaken with the informed consent of the Membership.
Proposer: R. J. Fitt.
- "Nominations for Executive Office shall be proposed and seconded only at a Special General Meeting of the Association to be held at least one month prior to the Annual General meeting. Proxies will be accepted.
"Twenty Members shall form a quorum for the Special General Meeting. No other business shall be conducted unless the required quorum for a regular General Meeting is present."
Explanation:
The process originally used by the Association was for nominations and elections to be held at the AGM. It was changed after it became difficult to achieve the necessary quorum, thus hamstringing the Association.The current system suffers from a few shortcomings. First, the nominations are submitted in isolation and many worthy nominees are disregarded for want of a seconder, since no one else may be aware of the nomination.
Presently, unless two separate individuals nominate the same person for the same office, that choice is voided. The proposed process would make known to all present who the nominees are, and thus invite support or otherwise.
While there is also merit in holding the election concurrently with the nomination process, thus avoiding wasted votes where a nominee becomes ineligible due to prior election to a higher post, the danger of a lack of quorum bringing the business of the Association to a halt, weighs in favour of a written ballot.
Thus the quorum for the Special General Meeting is set at an achievable level, but only for the purpose of nominations. The election will continue to be open to all Members.
Proposer: R. J. Fitt.
- "Motions to amend the Constitution of the Association may be submitted at any time in the course of the year for the consideration of the Association.
- "Such motions shall be circulated to all Members at least two weeks prior to any meeting at which they are to be considered, or prior to a written ballot on the matter."
Explanation:
Currently, motions to amend the constitution are considered only at the AGM. There is no good reason for this restraint.Proposer: R. J. Fitt.
- "Each Executive Officer shall receive an allowance of $50.00 per month to defray transport and communication expenses incurred in the execution of the Association’s business. The Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Secretary shall receive an additional $100.00 each for the same purpose."
"The Association shall establish a "Leave Bank" of days to be used as allocated by the Executive for the conduct of LIALPA business.
"Each Member shall relinquish to the Association’s leave bank 1 day of vacation for each 21 days (minimum) earned.
"The Leave Bank provisions will be implemented once agreement has been reached with the Company as to its operation."
Proposer: R. J. Fitt.
"The Association will establish an office at an appropriate location with full-time secretarial staff."
Explanation:
The above 3 proposals are intended to ease some of the burden of the Executive Members and to enhance their productivity. As you should appreciate, an inordinate amount of time is required to adequately attend to the affairs of the Association and the needs of its members. At present, this time is taken from the personal free time of the officers, which is quite unfair, and greatly inhibits their efforts on our behalf.While it may appear that by giving up one or two days leave a signal is being sent that we have too much, this is no more true than saying that because we contribute money to the Association, we deserve less pay.
A central office and secretary would further free the executive from time consuming housekeeping chores, and make the resources of the Association more accessible to the Members.
Proposer: R. J. Fitt.
News and Views | Simulator Sickness | Twins #;^)
The Politics of Aviation Safety | A Lesson in Worms #;^)
Proposed Amendments | A Professional Approach #;^)
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