LIALPA SlipStream Newsletter, April, 1998

Editor: Capt. R. J. Fitt, IFALPA Director for LIALPA

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Here are links to the articles - just click, and you're there.
Here we go again! | Expert Perceptions | Couldn't Happen Here!
Managing Flight Deck Awareness | IFALPA LOL Update

 

 HERE WE GO AGAIN!

Once more we are faced with a damaged airplane at a time when we are already short on equipment. Our luck can only improve.

I wonder if we will ever be given the opportunity to get something positive from this accident. Past experience would indicate that it will recede into the mists of our troubled history like all other incidents.

It is generally recognized that accident inquiries should be conducted with one particular aim: to avoid recurrences by educating interested parties about possible pitfalls – to learn from the experience. The use of the process to apportion blame is essentially counter-productive as the sources of first-hand information will inevitably either dry up, or be tainted by self-interest. And without integrity, the process becomes a counter-productive witch-hunt.

Some years ago, an apparently enlightened management established the position of Safety Officer. There are a couple of basic flaws in the appointment which, I feel, make it less effective than it could be. The Safety Officer reports to his Department head and, further, lacks adequate logistical support to function effectively.

The usual recommendation is that a Safety Officer reports directly to top management, since safety problems within a department might be covered up or ignored by its head unless there is oversight. Likewise, with no time to establish programs, or carry out necessary research and recurrent training, the Safety Officer’s effectiveness is greatly diminished.

From the total absence of accident analysis reports, one might be led to believe that our record is unblemished. We all know that is not the case here - or anywhere else. It is most important that our incidents and accidents are fully reported and analyzed, and the results circulated among us. This is not to be seen as an opportunity to point fingers at our colleagues, but to learn from events which have occurred within the area of highest relevance to us – our own route structure.

Have we ever seen a Safety Officer’s report? I have not. Is this because there have not been any? If not, then why not?

If there have been reports, do their contents not concern us? One can only hope that they are not being used only to assess culpability.

We need to use our assets more effectively than we currently do. The position of Safety Officer is vitally important in an airline and should be treated as such. He must be given the support to function effectively and impartially. We stand to gain much from his effective performance.

 

Expert Pilots' Perceptions of Problem Situations

Ute Fischer : San Jose State University : Judith Orasanu : NASA-Ames Research Center : Mike Wich : San Jose State University

(Edited.)

How do expert pilots interpret flight-related problem situations and what aspects do they find important for making decisions?

These questions are not as easy to answer as they at first might appear. Aviation decision situations are often complex and a number of factors may influence decision making. Candidate variables are - to name just a few - phase of flight, aircraft type, problem type, available time and resources, or risk involved.

Orasanu (1994) presents a model of aviation decision making that emphasizes the role of situation assessment: Deciding on a course of action is contingent upon an adequate understanding of the nature of the problem and of the response options afforded by the problem situation. Risk and time pressure are situational variables that further constrain the decision process. One goal of our present work was to validate this process model from the pilot's perspective.

Our second goal was to determine the role of pilot experience on the selection of decision-relevant features. Numerous studies on expertise have shown that experience changes people's understanding of problems (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973; Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, 1981). Similarly we expected that more experienced pilots approach situations differently and focus on different aspects than less experienced pilots. Experience in an aviation context,

moreover, does not only mean years of pilot practice but also has a more specific sense: experience in a particular crew position. Captains, first officers and flight engineers fulfill different roles and have different responsibilities during both normal and abnormal situations. How pilots view problem situations may thus be a function of their role-specific experience rather than be determined by years of experience.

In studies 1 and 2, we investigated what features pilots select during a hypothetical decision making exercise and whether experience influences this process. Study 3 was designed to explore further the role of experience in this context.

Studies 1 and 2 show(ed) that aviation decision making involves the following components: Pilots assess how much risk there is in a given situation, how much time they have left for making a decision and whether there is only one, clear-cut answer to a problem, or whether the situation leaves options.

We also found that not all pilots used the same set of situational features in making aviation decisions. The captains in study 1 were primarily sensitive to risk and time pressure. Flight engineers and to a lesser extent first officers categorized situations in terms of available response options.

These findings leave us with two questions:

  1. Did the captains, first officers and flight engineers in study 1 pick up different situational features because pilots in different positions bring also different kinds of knowledge to decision making? Or, do all pilots know the same things and only different aspects of decision situations are salient to them?

  2. Do the differences in feature selection that we observed for captains, first officers and flight engineers, reflect biases specific to crew roles, or are they the result of differences in years of aviation experience? It seems likely that the participants in study 1 focused on those situational aspects that were consistent with the responsibilities associated with their crew position.

Alternatively, the differences in feature selection may simply reflect differences in years of experience: The captains in study 1 were much more senior than the first officers who, in turn, had more aviation experience than the flight engineers. We will take up this issue in study 3. First we want to turn to question 1.

Recall that all pilots in study 2 judged the decision scenarios with respect to risk, time pressure, problem definition, and response determinacy. If knowledge differences existed between these groups, captains, first officers, and flight engineers should differ in their ratings of the scenarios.

The groups agreed strongly in their ratings of the scenarios along all four variables. These results suggest that the captains, first officers and flight engineers in study 1 focused on those situational features that were salient to them. Knowledge differences between the groups does not seem to be a plausible explanation.

Study 3.

Twenty-nine pilots from a different US airline volunteered as subjects. There were 13 captains with an average of 15 years of experience in civil transport.

The 16 first officers had on average 10 years of civil aviation experience.

The primary dimension for this new group of captains was also "Risk"…and also entails some evaluation of time pressure.

These findings support the view that pilots focus on situational aspects that are consistent with their crew role. Years of aviation experience per se does not seem to have a significant impact. The captains in study 3 showed preferences similar to their more senior colleagues in study 1 and differed in their judgments from the first officers in study 1 who were their equal in years of aviation experience.

 

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

In this series of studies we investigated what situational aspects expert pilots use in making aviation decisions. Our analyses both confirm and expand Orasanu's (1994) model of aviation decision making. They confirm the model with respect to its components. The situational features, "Risk," "Time Pressure," and "Response Determinacy" that were discerned in our current work, are also included in the model.

However, the model does not sufficiently acknowledge the primacy of risk and time assessment that was evident in our analyses. Our findings suggest that both variables greatly shape what pilots will do. Risk and time pressure may call for an immediate response whether or not the problem was fully understood.

Minimal risk levels and time constraints, in contrast, permit additional diagnostic actions or the deliberation of options.

Our analyses also indicate that there is not a single set of features that all pilots exploit. Instead, we found that captains, first officers and flight engineers focused on those aspects during hypothetical decision making that were consistent with the particular responsibilities associated with their crew role.

The captains were particularly sensitive to risk and time pressure; i.e., to situational features that are fundamental to aeronautical decision making insofar as they delineate the ground on which decisions can be made. First officers and flight engineers emphasized the response side of the decision making process. They distinguished between situations that provided for only one response and those situations that left options.

These differences between crew positions do not reflect knowledge differences.

We found that first officers and flight engineers agreed with their captains in assessments of risk, time pressure, and response determinacy. The differences in feature selection that we observed between pilots, thus reflect role-specific differences in the perception of problem situations.

What are the implications of role-specific perceptions for crew training? First we want to emphasize that our research does not warrant any normative training recommendations in the sense of what situational features pilots should or should not use in aviation decision making. However, our studies do suggest that crew training should stress the need for crew members to discuss openly their views on problem situations since diverse perspectives are possible.

A second implication of our studies for crew training concerns pilot upgrading.

Given that pilots' perceptions of problem situations depend on their pilot role, then we cannot expect that first officers who upgrade bring a captain's mind-set to decision making. Training accordingly should include instruction in role-consistent approaches to problem situations.

 

IT COULDN'T HAPPEN HERE.(?)
Thanks, Gary.

Once upon a time, a Britsh company and a Japanese company decided to have a competitive boat race on the River Thames. The Japanese won by a mile.

The British firm became very discouraged by the loss and morale sagged. Senior management decided that the reason for the crushing defeat had to be found, and a project team was set up to investigate the problem and recommend appropriate action.

Their conclusion: The Japanese team had eight people rowing and one person steering. The British team had one person rowing and eight people steering.

Senior management immediately hired a consultancy company to do a study of the British team's structure. Millions of pounds and several months later they concluded that: Too many people were steering and not enough rowing.

To prevent losing to the Japanese next year, the team structure was changed to four "Steering Managers", three "Senior Steering Managers", and one "Executive steering Manager".

A performance appraisal system was set up to give the person rowing the boat
more incentive to work harder and become a key performer.

The next year the Japanese won by two miles.

So the British company laid off the rower for poor performance, sold off all the oars, cancelled all capital investments for new equipment and halted development of a new boat, awarded high performance awards to the consultants and distributed the money saved to senior management.

 

MANAGING SITUATION AWARENESS ON THE FLIGHT DECK or THE NEXT BEST THING TO A CRYSTAL BALL

Sheryl L. Chappell - NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

If you had a crystal ball, you would be aware of everything that is happening and is going to happen to your aircraft and the airspace you fly through, because the consequences of a lapse in awareness can be deadly. Reports to NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) show many ways that situation awareness can slip away. Some of the lessons learned by others provide a recipe for managing awareness. What we're going to try to do in the next few pages is figure out how to direct our attention so that it's always where it needs to be.

Put another way, we'll be learning how to be aware. The goal is to build skills that result in more awareness; it's the next best thing to having a crystal ball.

From the very first flight lesson, we were taught to 'aviate, navigate, communicate' in that order. To aviate, navigate and communicate, you must be aware of the plane, the path, and the people (crew, passengers, dispatchers, and air traffic controllers). Not only do you need to monitor and evaluate these three things now, but you need to anticipate what's going to happen in the future and also consider contingencies. The current and future state of the plane, the path, and the people are the components of the plan.

The skills for being aware of what's happening now are different than the skills for anticipating what is going to happen later and considering what could

happen. To many pilots these skills are second nature. They are continuously aware of the plane, the path, and the people and can project into the future and maintain this awareness. However, like all skills, these can be refined and that's our goal here.

Now

Monitor.

The first skill is monitoring. Unfortunately, we humans have limits to how much we can see and hear at the same time. If we had to put our monitoring goal into one rule, it would be: Be aware of what you need to and ignore everything else. Let's look at some techniques that can move us toward this goal.

Think of how you focus and direct your attention as you would focus and direct a flashlight. Imagine that everything you are aware of is in the beam of the flashlight. You can hold it steady in one direction and focus the beam (your attention) very narrowly so that you are able to see a small area extremely well. This allows you to ignore all else and concentrate on that small area.

Knowing what you can ignore, if even for a moment, allows you to focus on that which you need to be aware of. Narrowly focused attention can be appropriate when you are solving a difficult problem, as long as someone else is attending to the other plane/path/people issues. The checklist is probably the most common tool for focusing attention. Each crew member knows what they are to look at, when, and very importantly, they know what the other crew members are looking at.

On the other hand, if you broaden the flashlight beam and move it around, you are aware of everything about the plane, the path, and the people. You have the big picture, but less detail in any one area. Well, naturally your job requires you to do both, to focus on a problem and to keep the big picture.

This is difficult. There is no way to know when to step back from what you are attending to and move that flashlight around, or move it to a developing problem area for a closer look. Remember, everything has to be covered all the time, so if someone has their flashlight (their attention) focused narrowly in one direction, the other crew member(s) should broaden their beam and keep it moving.

You can point your attentional flashlight in the wrong direction and get sidetracked. There are also things that get in the way of where you're directing the flashlight. Things arise that block your view, both literally and figuratively. These are distractions and they come in many forms. Often in the incident reports received by NASA, a distraction is the first link in the chain of events that lead to an incident, sometimes embarrassing and sometimes dangerous. More about distractions later.

 

Evaluate.

It should be pointed out that in addition to monitoring the plane/path/people, you need to evaluate the status of each. The evaluation entails first comprehending what you see and hear. Secondly, you make an assessment of the status of each, the plane/path/people. This leads to an understanding of what the situation is now, this gives you situation awareness for the current state.

Future

Anticipate.

A key to maintaining situation awareness is to anticipate; stay ahead of the airplane. If you project what is going to happen later, you will go a long way toward that crystal-ball view. It's like having the answers before the test.

Anticipating simply involves projecting the current situation into the future. Most of the time everything follows the laws of physics and the prediction is very accurate. Standard procedures allow you to anticipate what other crew members will do in a given situation.

A crew that is skilled in managing their situation awareness has a shared vision of what's going to happen in the next few minutes and on into the future. Anticipation is particularly important for high workload situations.

If you as a crew know what each person's responsibility is ahead of time, the awareness level can remain high on each person's part, even when a lot is going on.

 

Consider Contingencies.

Sometimes things happen that cannot be anticipated.

These can be aircraft malfunctions, ATC clearances, or simply a normal event at an unexpected time. These are the things that simulator checks are made of.

Playing the 'what if' game has a tremendous advantage in the management of situation awareness. As a common example, when properly briefing an approach, the entire crew is made aware of the required flight path for the missed approach.

Should a missed approach be executed, each crew member has a shared awareness of the sequence of actions, the airport environment, and the navigational information. They collectively know the 'what', 'where', 'when', and 'who' of the missed approach procedure.

There is no substitute for thinking things through ahead of time and dividing the tasks and the information so that both become manageable., Using the flashlight analogy again, this allows focus on the big picture and the necessary details, no matter what situation you are presented with.

 

Plan.

The plan is comprised of the current and future states of the plane, the path, and the people. This plan is the foundation all crew members are building their situation awareness upon. The plan is constantly being updated based on the awareness activities. As a crew monitors, evaluates, anticipates, and considers contingencies they continuously modify the plan. Ensuring the entire crew has the same shared plan will ensure that they have a shared situation awareness.

 

Traps.

Below are some traps that can take away situation awareness, if you allow yourself to fall into them. Knowing they are there will hopefully make them easy to avoid.

Focus on the right information at the right time. Keeping the priorities straight is a constant challenge, as this report describes.

"After we exited the runway, the first officer asked me a question about the ground control frequency, and I looked down at the airport diagram which was on the yoke in front of me. When I looked up, I saw the runway markings for the approach end of runway 7L in front of me. I then looked right and observed a wide-body aircraft approaching our intersection on his takeoff run on runway 25R. I slammed on the brakes and we came to a stop about 20 feet short of the runway."

"Two flight attendants were out of their seats, but fortunately no one was injured, although I did have a plane load of concerned passengers. My airline has been emphasizing 'situational awareness' lately, but although I was familiar with LAX and well aware of runway 24L, I monetarily lost track of where I was while I dealt with the question about ground control frequency. This brief lapse could have been fatal and it underlined the importance of knowing where you are at all times, and above all, control the aircraft first and worry about the incidentals once that is accomplished."

- ASRS Report 135526

Be sure to take your awareness vitamin before every flight. Even those who have had the situation awareness vaccination can have lapses.

 

If something doesn't look or feel right, it probably isn't.

As humans we are aware of many cues from our surroundings for which we cannot always identify the origin. These cues are very real. Don't ignore them, even when they only manifest themselves in a feeling of uneasiness. Excerpts from the cockpit voice recorder prior to the tragic accident in Cali, Columbia emphasize this point. The flight crew turned their aircraft into a mountain.

First Officer:"Uh, where are we... we goin' out to ..."

Captain: "Lets go right to, uh, Tulua first of all. OK?"

"Yeah, where we headed?"

A few seconds later, Captain identifies Tulua.

Captain:"Just doesn't look right on mine. I don't know why."

Two minutes later they impacted a mountain.

 

Watch out when you're busy or bored.

Studies of humans performing many different tasks show us that we will be less likely to detect something when we're busy attending to something else. We will also be less likely to detect something when we're not attending to much of anything. During times of low and high workload try to compensate for this human characteristic and be more vigilant. Work out crew procedures to keep each other in the loop during these times. Predetermine roles for high workload times, especially abnormal situations.

 

Habits are hard to break.

As highly trained flight crews you have developed very complex habit structures.

These enable you to perform all the tasks required to skillfully fly your aircraft. There are times when these habits can get in the way of safety.

If you are required to perform a task differently than you normally would, watch out, because the habit pattern may take over without your even realizing it. The best way to combat this natural tendency is to create a barrier, so that you prevent or at least are aware of what you are doing.

For example, when receiving an aircraft with a failed generator, one airline directs its crews to put a coffee cup over the flap handle so that later, during the approach, the flap handle will look and feel different and alert them not to lower the flaps according to the normal landing checklist. This procedure was adapted after many instances of pilots failing into their normal habit patterns during the high workload approach phase and failing to use the non-normal checklist.

 

Expectation can reduce awareness.

Above we discussed the importance of anticipation. The downside of anticipation is that it can bias your hearing or seeing what is really there. It is very common that the reports to the ASRS contain the phrase "we heard what we expected to hear." This trap often comes in the form of published 'expect' altitudes on arrival charts or familiarity with an airport, resulting in an altitude deviation.

When you are expecting something, double check to make sure that it really was the way you expected it to be.

 

Things that take longer are less likely to get done right.

It is especially true in the cockpit with all the things going on, that if you're doing something over a period of time, it is less likely to get done correctly. Fuel cross-feeding is an example that most of us are familiar with.

The problem is that you get interrupted with other tasks during the time that you're cross-feeding so that the time seems shorter, or you might even forget that you have the cross-feeds on. Take special precaution when a task takes a long time, is subject to interruption, or is something that you can't do right away and have to remember to do later.

Fuel cross-feeding, checklists (especially before-start) and contacting the tower at the outer marker, are examples of things that have shown up in ASRS reports as not getting done right or not at all. We'll talk later about creating reminders that will help alleviate a lack of awareness for these tasks.

Reliable systems aren't always reliable.

We know logically that all the systems we rely on to get an airplane from point A to B can fail. We practice this stuff in the simulator. However, research has shown that people actually stop cross-checking reliable systems.

When the system fails it can go undetected. This is especially true in glass cockpits where systems are very reliable and failures are difficult to detect. The only cure for this is to force yourself to double check information against other sources.

 

It's hard to detect something that isn't there.

Probably the hardest task we have being pilots and being human, is to detect something that isn't there. Much of what we need to be aware of is the absence of something. You'll probably notice that the engine fire bell/light isn't on, but harder to detect is that the other crew member didn't say, "after-takeoff checklist complete" or that the green arc didn't move to reflect the new crossing restriction you thought you entered correctly.

Sometimes even serious aircraft malfunctions can be manifested in the absence of a subtle cue, at least at first. The only way to detect something that isn't there is to specifically look for it's absence.

These checks have to be built into your flying techniques, your personal checklists.

 

Automation keeps secrets.

The information in the glass cockpit is sometimes less obvious than in the traditional cockpit. A simple error in a numerical entry, if not caught at the time of input, can be nearly impossible to detect and correct.

 

Distractions come in many forms.

Crew distractions are a serious impediment to safety. Probably the most documented case was the Eastern Air Lines L-1011 crash in the Florida Everglades that was the result of the crew's preoccupation with a landing- gear problem.

This brings us back to the juggling act between focusing on a specific area and keeping the big picture. Distractions result when the attention flashlight beam is too narrowly focused and not moving.

Many things pop up in that beam of light that get in the way of seeing everything that is going on. A list of distractions compiled by Capt. Monan (1978) from 169 reports to the ASRS show some examples of distractions that led to a variety of safety incidents.

 

Type of Distraction & Number of Reports

Non operational activities:

 

Flight Tasks:

                      Total - 169

 

The ASRS incident reports describe many cases of pilots being faced with an aircraft malfunction that distract the situation awareness of the crew.

Sometimes the malfunctions are big and obvious, sometimes they're small and elusive. Someone has to attend to the malfunction and figure out the appropriate course of action. What often happens is that everyone is engaged in solving the problem and no one is flying the airplane. No one has the big picture, the wide, sweeping beam of attention.

Capts. Sumwalt and Watson (1995) took a further look at ASRS reports, examining 230 reports of inflight aircraft malfunctions. The attentional demands on the flight crew during the resolution of the aircraft malfunction caused adverse safety consequences in 38 reports.

The safety consequences included altitude deviations, course/track/heading deviations, non-adherence to other ATC clearances, and non-compliance with FARs or company procedures. When a malfunction occurs, it should trigger a 'red flag' for a heightened sensitivity to a potential loss of situation awareness.

Sometimes distractions come from something that has already happened and is over. Many incidents have been the result of a crew dwelling on something that has previously happened and neglecting the current situation. You have to recognize that you're doing this and shake it off. Think and talk about it later, on the ground.

How to build a Crystal Ball.

There are a few tricks that you can use to get and keep the awareness you need to fly safely. You can use 'plane, path, people' as a checklist. Take a moment to assess the current state of each.

If you periodically run this checklist, you'll find that your awareness has increased. Most of the surprises will go away and the ones that pop up will be more manageable.

 

Manage Crew Awareness.

Crew procedures are designed to focus attention and keep the big picture, by dividing the awareness responsibilities. When functioning as a crew, you not only have to concern yourself with what you're doing, but also with what other people are doing. You need to check that the other crew members do certain things that fall into their area of responsibility.

You also need to check that they do not do certain things that are inappropriate or unsafe. Crew shared awareness is high when doing a checklist. Attention is focused on each item as one crew member reads and another checks.

It's obvious what's being looked at and by whom. We've developed other techniques, e.g., for handing off the job of listening to ATC, saying "you've got the radio." Many of the other things we do in an airplane are less structured. It's these other situations that cause a crew to misunderstand who's aware (or not aware) of what.

A study by the National Transportation Safety Board (1994) showed that monitoring/challenging failures were identified in 31 of the 37 accidents reviewed. Crew members failed to monitor and challenge the errors or the lack of awareness of the other crew members. As a crew member, you have to watch each other for what actions are taken and what actions aren't taken.

"What do they know that I need to know?" As team members we need to utilize all our sources of information to be aware of everything we need to be. Many of those sources are other people's eyes and ears. Use all the sources of information you have available to maximize your situation awareness.

"What do I know that they need to know?" Periodically ask yourself, "Do I know something my other crew members don't that they should know?" If the answer is yes, then tell them. If the answer is that they don't need to know, but they should know that you're keeping an eye on it, then tell them that you are.

When something takes your attention away from what the other crew members are expecting you to keep an eye on, tell them that too. There will be times when, despite your crystal ball, you will have a reduced level of awareness due to fatigue, distraction or some other factor. Let the other crew members know when this is the case, so that they can back you up more carefully.

"What do none of us know that we need to know?" The other question to ask yourself is, "What are we as a crew not paying attention to?"

If everyone is looking at the same thing, then something's getting missed. If you are unsure whether another crew member is maintaining awareness of something, be sure to clarify. The request "keep an eye on that for me" comes in handy.

 

Create Reminders.

A powerful way to ensure awareness is to create reminders. There are many that are employed by flight crews, both formally and informally. Checklists are formal reminders. Some people have developed informal reminders, such as turning the checklist upside down on the yoke clip when it is interrupted, as a physical reminder that it has not been completed.

Other reminders include selecting the radar test pattern when cross-feeding fuel and putting the nose landing light upon being cleared to land. These are obvious visual reminders that are in the scan of normal flying activities.

Reminders can be aural as well. Some pilots have the technique of selecting the audio for the outer marker when they have been instructed to contact the tower at the outer marker way out on the approach. This gives them a reminder that they don't have to look at during a busy time in the flight.

As we discussed above, things that take longer, things that are subject to interruptions, or that can't be done until later are less likely to get done right. Creating reminders for these things is probably the best, if not the only, defense against forgetting them. Reminders work for other things as well.

Reminders should be unique and consistently used for the same thing. That's why the string around the finger never worked.

Summary

So, in summary, there are a few key things to do to manage your situation awareness:

OK, so the bottom line is "Be aware of where you attention is, and is not."  Don't fall into the awareness traps. Just like money, situation awareness is very hard to get and very easy to let slip away. Periodically stop and ask yourself, "Is there something that we're not aware of that can bite us?" If you do manage your situation awareness, you'll have the next best thing to a crystal ball.

 

NEW IFALPA LOSS OF LICENCE INSURANCE SCHEME.

In response to members’ comments over the years, a new Loss of Licence plan has been developed. It is available to any qualified pilot who is a member in good standing of an IFALPA Member Association.

It has been designed to give a greater choice to pilots. Options include:

Sums insured are from US$30,000 to US$300,000 (or a maximum of 4 times salary to age 49, 2 times from age 50 onwards.)

Premiums for basic coverage vary from 9.60 per 10,000 currency units at age 24, up to 225 currency units at age 55 years.

More details are available from me. Brochures are expected soon from IFALPA.

 

Our Colonial Hangover.

The purpose of Colonialism, as we all should know, was to establish a system for the enrichment of the Mother Country’s economy. A corollary of this was the creation in the possessions of lesser fiefdoms for functionaries who might otherwise be underutilized.

Another consequence was that systems and standards were put in place to allow for more efficient societies. Initially it was clear that these benefits were not really meant to be shared with the natives who had to be satisfied with the crumbs that accidentally fell from the master’s table.

The colonial experience has left lasting scars on the psyches of the former colonial citizens, mostly in the form of an enduring inferiority complex. And though our former colonial masters are more enlightened in their policies, from time to time it becomes apparent that the rules for their citizens need not apply to their former wards.

The standards of commercial flight operations with which we are most familiar are those of the United States and the United Kingdom. By the accidents of history, we are most influenced by the latter.

Yet it was in response to pressure from the former that we were forced to drag ourselves from post-colonial backwardness to the adoption of modern regulations designed to ensure safe operating procedures. Being independent, we were formerly allowed to follow increasingly outdated laws; and for our part, we never aspired to do better, nor felt that we deserved it.

That is now all behind us, however, as our Directorate of Civil Aviation is now mandating the adoption of all the relevant regulations to bring us into conformity with current norms. And due to our history, and understandable inability to create our own regulations, we are essentially adopting the British system.

This, coupled with the promise of effective oversight, and expert advice from the UK Authorities, satisfies the USA that our operations are likely to present little risk to its citizens when we enter its airspace.

But we are not home free yet. It turns out that we are once more being classified as inferior to our former colonizers, our value less than par.

CAP 371 is a document produced to guide UK operators in the prevention of fatigue in aircrews. It is a very detailed scheme based on considerable research into the subject and establishes minimum criteria to ensure adequate work rules for pilots in the UK. It is well respected worldwide

The provisions of CAP 371 were to be implemented by air operators in the OECS from 1/1/98. However, certain companies sought to delay its implementation due to their lack of planning and cynical expectation of an exemption. During the grace period granted, intense pleading, lobbying and possibly political pressure was used to water down the requirements so as to reduce their economic implications. The authorities caved in.

Our leaders have reaffirmed their belief that their people are worth less and thus deserve less protection.

Are we convinced that we deserve better, that "Massa Day" is really done?

Here we go again! | Expert Perceptions | Couldn't Happen Here!
Managing Flight Deck Awareness | IFALPA LOL Update

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