LIALPA SlipStream Newsletter, March, 1998 Editor: Capt. R. J. Fitt, IFALPA Director for LIALPA

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HAPPY NEW YEAR | Short-haul | Managing Fatigue
Article: Error-tolerant Crew Procedures | Useful WebSites
T&S Committee | Checking & Training

 HAPPY NEW YEAR

New is a relative term. We’re back after a rather lengthy hiatus since the holidays, made a little longer by a minor accident which resulted in the erasure of the first version of this issue.

Our company continues to inhabit the ICU bed nearest the morgue, with no recovery in sight. We’ve been there so long now, it would be great just to be ailing again. Many of us wonder at the developments in the company (or lack thereof), and in the region. However, in our present situation, LIALPA has little influence over major developments, and are hampered in our efforts for improved conditions by the paralysis of the management team.

Our own development as a pilots’ association is also in stasis. The reason for this is quite simple: the work of the association is borne on the shoulders of a small number of volunteers working part-time, while also trying to maintain an acceptable family life.

Our membership numbers in three figures. Ministering to their needs takes a considerable amount of time. Add to that the perpetual negotiations, and the housekeeping requirements of an association, and you can readily see the necessity of a full-time secretary in a full-time office.

The principle seems to be well accepted, and premises are available. The next step is the most important, and the most difficult – finding an appropriate candidate for the post.

If we can implement this, our council will have more time and better support for their efforts on our behalf. But there is another problem to be attended to in this area. We must establish a bank of days off, which can be made available to council members for Association work. These days would have to be donated from members’ leave entitlements and incorporated into the roster for minimum disruption of schedules.

We can also position ourselves to be more influential in the region through involvement in Caribbean ALPA, which holds its second meeting in Nassau on March 26. This initiative is being encouraged by IFALPA whose President, Rob McInnis will be attending, accompanied by the PVP (Membership and Regional Affairs), Wim Van Beek.

Most of our attention and energies in the past have been focused on matters of a more immediate nature, essentially reacting to situations imposed on us from above. Attendance at the various for a where these decisions are discussed can steer policies in a direction more friendly to our interests.

 

Short-haul Commercial Operations

This study was conducted to examine the extent of sleep loss, circadian disruption and fatigue engendered by flying commercial short-haul air transport operations (flight legs less than eight hours). In this study, 74 pilots from two different airlines were studied before, during, and after 3- and 4-day commercial short-haul trips. All flights took place on the East Coast of the United States and occurred throughout the year. As a group, the pilots averaged 41.3 years of age and had, on average, 14.6 years of airline experience.

Using the Pilot's Daily Logbook, subjects provided subjective ratings of fatigue and mood every two hours while awake, and recorded their sleep episodes and other activities (e.g., meals, exercise, duty time). All subjects completed a background questionnaire and a NASA cockpit observer accompanied crews during trip schedules.

The specific daytime and evening trips studied were selected to provide information about the upper range of fatigue reported by pilots in these operations. Common features of the trip schedules included early report times and multiple flight legs (average 5.5/day) over long duty days. The trips averaged 10.6 hrs of duty per day and involved an average of 4.5 hrs of flight time. One-third of the duty periods studied was longer than 12 hours. The average rest period was 12.5 hrs long and usually occurred progressively earlier in the day across successive trip days. Data from the self-report daily logbook demonstrated that during the trip nights, pilots took longer to fall asleep (about 12 mins. longer), slept less (about 1.2 hrs shorter), and awoke earlier (about 1.4 hrs) compared to pre-trip sleep patterns. The pilots reported this trip sleep as lighter and poorer (with more awakenings) compared to pre-trip sleep. Subjective fatigue and mood were worse during layovers compared to levels pre-trip, during flights, or post-trip.

Significant time-of-day effects were found for fatigue, negative emotions, and activation ratings. In the first three ratings of the day, fatigue and negative emotion ratings were low following awakening, and increased to reach their highest values in the final rating prior to sleep. Predictably, activation ratings showed the inverse of this pattern.

On trip days, pilots consumed more caffeine (average 3.4 servings) compared to on pre-trip days (average 1.9 servings) and on post-trip days (average 2.7 servings), presumably to maintain alertness during operations. These were consumed primarily in the early morning associated with the earlier wakeup and duty times and also, during the mid-afternoon peak in physiological sleepiness.

During the trip schedule more alcohol (average 1.6 servings) was consumed compared to pre-trip (average 0.5 servings) and post-trip (average 1.0 servings) days. The additional alcohol consumption can be assumed to have occurred after coming off duty (presumably to "spin down" after a long duty day) and before sleep (and within accordance of Federal Aviation Regulations).

This was one of the first field studies conducted by the NASA program and provides a unique insight into the physiological and subjective effects of flying short-haul commercial operations. It demonstrated that these measures could be obtained in an operational environment without disturbing regular performance of duties.

The study results suggest several significant operational considerations regarding fatigue. For example, the data showed that the daily duty durations were double the flight durations and a third of the duty periods was longer than 12 hours. The present Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) set specific pilot limits based on actual flight times. Findings from this study suggest that limitations on duty time should be considered, just as flight times are currently limited. Also, the practice of earlier duty times on successive trip days, requiring earlier wakeup times, interferes with obtaining adequate sleep. Even when the layovers were relatively long, the circadian system would generally inhibit falling asleep earlier and hence the significant sleep loss during trip nights. Therefore, when possible, duty times across successive trip days should remain constant or begin progressively later (moving with the natural tendency of the biological clock to extend the day).

Finally, alcohol is known to disrupt sleep dramatically and therefore contributes to the poor quantity and quality of sleep obtained on trip nights. Alternative approaches to the use of alcohol to unwind after duty and promote sleep should be identified and offered (e.g., relaxation techniques).

From NASA Fatigue Countermeasures Task Force. Technical Contact: David Neri http://olias.arc.nasa.gov/zteam

 

 

Managing Fatigue

Humans are hard-wired with a genetically determined biological need for sleep and with a circadian pacemaker that programs us to sleep at night and to be awake during the day, on a 24-hour schedule. Twenty-four hour operations challenge these basic physiological principles. Shiftwork, altered and changing work schedules, crossing time zones, long hours of continuous wakefulness, and sleep loss can create sleep and circadian disruptions that degrade waking function. On an individual basis, this translates to fatigue and sleepiness while driving, monitoring equipment, operating aircraft, and performing medical procedures; into degraded vigilance and decision-making; and into a wide range of other performance effects that can erode the safety margin in operational settings.

Examples from diverse segments of society demonstrate how these individual vulnerabilities can translate into significant incidents and accidents. Investigations have identified fatigue as a probable cause of accidents in different modes of transportation. For example, the National Transportation Safety Board has cited fatigue as a probable cause in the Exxon Valdez and World Prodigy marine accidents and in the crash of a DC-8 aircraft in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Fatigue has also been cited in the nuclear accidents at Three Mile Island and Bhopal and in the decision-making process of the Space Shuttle Challenger accident.

Addressing the physiological factors that underlie fatigue has the potential to maintain or improve the safety margin and, concomitantly, to increase performance and productivity.

When someone is deprived of sleep, the physiological response is sleepiness, which is the brain's signal to prompt an individual to obtain sleep, a signal that a specific physiological requirement has not been met. Eventually, when deprived of sleep (acutely or chronically), the human brain can spontaneously, in an uncontrolled fashion, shift from wakefulness to sleep in order to meet its physiological need for sleep.

The sleepier the person, the more rapid and frequent the intrusions of sleep into wakefulness. Such spontaneous sleep episodes can be very short (i.e., microsleeps lasting only seconds) or extended (i.e., lasting minutes). At the onset of sleep, which can occur during periods of intense sleepiness, an individual disengages perceptually from the external environment, essentially ceasing to integrate outside information. A sleepy person's performance can begin to degrade even before actual sleep intrusions into waking. A microsleep can be associated with a significant performance lapse during which an individual does not receive or respond to external information. With sleep loss, these uncontrolled sleep episodes can occur while standing or operating machinery or even in situations, such as driving a car, in which inattention would put an individual at risk. In other situations, although the person may not actually fall asleep, the level of sleepiness can still significantly degrade human performance in the ways described above. This performance degradation can play an insidious role in the occurrence of an operational incident or accident.

Laboratory data indicate that, for most people, one night with 2 hours less sleep than is usually required is sufficient to degrade subsequent waking performance and alertness significantly.

Signs and Symptoms of Fatigue:

Forgetful
Fixated
Poor decisions
Apathetic
Slowed reaction time
Lethargic
Reduced vigilance
Bad mood
Poor communication
Nodding off.

An individual who requires 8 hours of sleep and obtains only 6 hours is essentially sleep-deprived by 2 hours. If that individual sleeps only 6 hours each night over 4 nights, then the 2 hours of sleep loss per night would accumulate into an 8-hour sleep debt.

Generally, recuperation from a sleep debt involves obtaining deeper sleep over 1 to 2 nights. Sleep loss also can result in some extension of the usual sleep duration. However, this extension is much less than would be required to "make up" the lost hours of sleep (i.e., by having to sleep 7.5 hours longer on the weekend to "make up" for the sleep debt accumulated during the week). Both an increased amount of deep sleep and increased sleep duration can indicate a sleep debt.

Subjective sleepiness is an individual's introspective self-report of how sleepy he or she feels. Subjective reports of sleepiness can be affected by many factors, such as physical activity or a particularly stimulating environment, such as an interesting conversation. These factors tend to mask or conceal physiological sleepiness, and therefore lead people to overestimate their own level of alertness. Such a person, in an environment stripped of factors that conceal the underlying physiological sleepiness, would be susceptible to the occurrence of spontaneous, uncontrolled sleep and to the performance decrements associated with sleep debt.

For the individual facing the problem of fatigue at work, a variety of well-tested countermeasure strategies can help maintain alertness and on-the-job performance.

The effective use of days off and rest periods to catch up on sleep is critical.

Field studies in flight and other shiftwork environments have indicated that sleep loss during shiftwork is common. Because the effects of sleep loss are cumulative, it is important not to begin a new work schedule with an existing sleep debt. Generally, this requires two nights of unrestricted sleep. Under normal circumstances, it does not seem to be possible to obtain extra sleep to "stock up" on sleep against an anticipated debt in the future.

On working days, it is desirable to get at least as many hours of sleep as a normal night of sleep on a non-working day.

At certain times in the circadian cycle it is easy to fall asleep, and at other times the brain is programmed to be awake. For this reason, it is important to take advantage of feeling sleepy by sleeping if circumstances permit.

Conversely, it is impossible to force sleep. Trying unsuccessfully for 15-30 minutes to fall asleep is a signal to abandon the effort for the time being and

get out of bed. If the time available for sleep is limited, a quiet activity conducive to relaxing, such as reading, can be undertaken until sleepiness signals that it is time to go to bed and try again.

Naps can acutely improve alertness, even when people do not report feeling well rested on awakening. If a nap is just before work, or is likely to be interrupted for a call-out to work, then it should be limited to a maximum of 45 minutes. This minimizes the chances of entering deep sleep. Waking out of deep sleep may lead to feelings of grogginess and disorientation for several minutes (a phenomenon called "sleep inertia"). At other times, longer naps can be beneficial. Two hours will normally allow completion of one cycle through the different states and stages of sleep. A

nap reduces the duration of continuous wakefulness before a work period and can be particularly beneficial before a period of night work, when the challenge of working through the circadian low point is also a factor. Getting some sleep is always better than none.

The discomfort associated with being hungry, or with having eaten too much, may interfere with falling asleep. If one is hungry or thirsty at bedtime, a light snack or a small drink is preferable.

In general, evidence for effects of common dietary constituents on sleep is not yet conclusive, although both alcohol and caffeine have well-documented disruptive effects.

Alcohol is reputedly the most commonly used sleep aid used in the U.S. It can promote relaxation and thereby help a person to fall asleep, but it also produces easily disrupted lighter sleep. It suppresses REM (rapid-eye-movement) sleep in the first half of the night, leading to REM rebound and withdrawal

effects in the second half. Awakenings from intense dreaming activity, with sweating and headaches, are not uncommon. The amount of alcohol required to produce adverse effects is variable, depending on several factors including gender (women appear to be more sensitive), body mass, and age. In normal nonalcoholic volunteers, a blood level of 50-milligram percent (half the legal intoxication level in most states) is sufficient.

Caffeine stimulates the nervous system, generally taking effect in 15-45 minutes after ingestion; it usually remaining active for 3-5 hours, although the effects can continue for up to 10 hours in sensitive individuals. The effects of caffeine depend on a number of factors, including habitual usage, body mass, and

previous food intake. Regular high caffeine consumption tends to reduce the individual's sensitivity to its effects. Regardless of the level of habitual consumption, caffeine before sleep leads to lighter sleep with more awakenings and reduced total sleep time. Some conservative recommendations suggest stopping caffeine consumption as much as 6 hours before bedtime.

Nicotine has much the same effects on nocturnal sleep and subsequent daytime sleepiness and performance as caffeine does. Like caffeine, nicotine consumption (either tobacco smoking or patch) should not occur within several hours prior to the desired onset of sleep.

Strenuous exercise results in physiological activation, which may interfere with sleep. Therefore, it is advisable to avoid strenuous exercise within 6 hours of going to bed. There is also evidence that regular exercise may enhance deep sleep, which has been shown to be physically restorative.

Once the individual is on the job, the range of available strategies to combat fatigue is more restricted.

Social interaction and conversation can be a useful operational strategy. To maintain alertness, the individual must be actively involved in the conversation, not just listening and nodding. Findings in some studies have indicated that the lack of conversation is a predictor of declining physiological alertness. Experience from sleep deprivation experiments showed that physical activity is one of the most effective ways of combating sleepiness. Some stretching and isometric exercises can be done in the cockpit seat, and even writing or chewing gum may help a drowsy crew person stay awake.

The alerting effects of caffeine, although they are disruptive to sleep, can be used strategically when it is necessary to stay awake. Strategic caffeine use includes avoiding it when already alert - at the beginning of a daytime work period or just after a nap, for example. Instead, consumption should begin about an hour before expected times of decreased alertness (e.g., 3 AM to 5 AM). It is preferable to stop caffeine consumption at least three hours ahead of a planned bedtime to avoid its disruptive effects on sleep.

 

Adapted from "Managing Fatigue in Operational Settings I: Physiological Considerations and Countermeasures" by: Mark R. Rosekind, Philippa H. Gande, Kevin B. Gregory, Roy M. Smith, Donna L. Miller, Ray Oyung, Lissa L.Webbon, and Julie M. Johnson.

 

HAPPY NEW YEAR | Short-haul | Managing Fatigue
Article: Error-tolerant Crew Procedures | Useful WebSites
T&S Committee | Checking & Training

 

ELIMINATING "COCKPIT-CAUSED" ACCIDENTS

Error-tolerant Crew Procedures for the Year 2000
by Captain Steve Last

It is essential to the long-term future of the airline industry to make a major reduction in the overall accident rate. Human error, and in particular flight crew errors, is recognised as the most important single contributor to the current accident rate. Achieving the desired target requires a global reduction in collective crew errors of the order of 80%, but a decade or more of attempts to achieve this by improving individual crew member performance shows little prospect of meeting that objective.

One of the primary safety tools for flight crews is their Standard Operating Procedures. However, the "engineering" analysis of conventional crew operations

in this paper shows they cannot achieve the necessary reliability, because subordinate crew members cannot be relied on to switch from a "help" to an "oppose" mode when necessary. A "humanistic" analysis also indicates that this kind of failure is inherent in the culture of most societies.

Actual data on airline accidents, as well as much anecdotal and other evidence, indicates that the breakdown of crew procedures which require co-pilots to make a "mode switch" from "assist" to "prevent" is in fact a major factor in those accidents. An alternative, "delegated flying" method of operation should in theory be more reliable from both perspectives. Actual comparative data available indicates that this alternative procedure does indeed produce significantly better results, possibly as high as the 80% error reduction improvement needed, if not more.

The alternative "delegated flying" SOP incorporates techniques specifically recommended in ICAO´s recent CFIT study, as well as one of the fundamental problem-solving tools recommended in most CRM training. Consequently, there is an unarguable case for the industry to make changes which will incorporate the

concept of delegation of routine non-critical flying tasks into normal operating procedures for transports with a crew of two pilots or more. An implementation strategy is recommended which should enable the industry to achieve its safety target on all multi-crew transport aircraft at virtually zero cost, with no requirement for additional equipment.

Many airlines have already adopted the concept of delegating the approach handling in marginal weather or low visibility conditions, as is recommended by ICAO´s recent CFIT study. To achieve the safety improvement needed, it is simply necessary to extend this practice to become the "normal" way of operating, as opposed to a "special procedure" valuable only for unusual "low visibility" approaches, or for "problem situations" as suggested in CRM.

The impact of changing from the conventional "assisted piloting" to a "delegate and command" procedure has some subtle human relations benefits in each of the two major cultural extremes described earlier. In strongly hierarchical

cultures, it takes advantage of pre-existing attitudes, instead of attempting to undermine them. The F/O will now routinely fly the aircraft, as "the boss’s deputy" - not only when allowed to be a "pretend boss" himself. Specifically, he has to conduct much of the flight to the boss’s satisfaction, and particularly to fly the approach so that "the Boss" can make a good landing off it.

Psychologically, he has a strong incentive to adhere to rules and procedures: if he does it wrong, the boss will not be happy, since the boss is going to take over later - not just in the event that it gets so screwed up as to be actually dangerous. Conversely, if he does a really good job, his performance will make the boss’s task easier, reflecting well on the boss as well as on himself.

Collective, "team" performance is enhanced.

It is important to note that the suggestion that routine flying be delegated from the pilot to the co-pilot has no impact whatever on the concept of "First Officers sectors", other than to enhance their value. "Pilot-in-Command under Supervision" flying is essential to the long-term safety of the airline, not to its short-term safety. There is no change needed to an airline’s policies on this matter solely as a result of changing the "basic" procedure. During the F/O’s leg, he would make the takeoff and landing and the Captain fly the en-route and arrival.

(Entire paper is available on request. Or contact srlast@compuserve.com )

 

 

Technical & Safety Committee

The Technical & Safety Committee is being re-constituted for the new year. There is much to be tackled, and interested volunteers are welcome.

 

 

Checking and Training.

The issue of training has again come into focus with check ride grades being used to determine eligibility for promotion to command.

Our periodic checks are often entered on the roster as "training". Indeed, the Pilots Notes in the Operations Manual Vol. 2 describes one of the purposes of the Base check as being "to provide an opportunity ….. to practice emergency drills & procedures & is to be regarded as continuation training." The Line Check "..provides an opportunity for crews to discuss procedures and drills with Training Captains and should be regarded as continuation training."

The current working Agreement states that, if found unproficient, a pilot will be provided with training, presumably to become proficient.

My experience of check flights is probably not untypical. They are primarily CHECK flights where I am assessed on my ability to perform as required by the company’s SOP’s. No time is allocated to practice.

At the end of the exercise, I am either satisfactory or not. But while there are degrees of satisfactory performance, there is no remedial training to achieve a "really satisfactory " grade.

What do I mean by that? If the performance of a co-pilot is not satisfactory to act as PIC, then that person cannot be trusted to be the backup in the event of incapacitation of the PIC.

The bottom line is the "bottom line". Training is being scrimped on to save money, and quality is allowed to suffer.

Article 4, Section XI, of our Contract states: "All promotions shall be in accordance with system seniority." Any pilot with the seniority and legal qualifications to make a successful command bid should be given the opportunity to try for upgrading. If "continuation training" is properly conducted, the issue of substandard passes on checks will not apply.

Quality comes with a price, if you cannot afford it, you cannot maintain it. Given the business we’re in, how can we not afford it?

 

HAPPY NEW YEAR | Short-haul | Managing Fatigue
Article: Error-tolerant Crew Procedures | Useful WebSites
T&S Committee | Checking & Training

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